Long-Term Oil Demand Projections: Cross-Organization Comparison
Oil Demand Projections (mb/d)
| Year |
OPEC WOO-2022 |
OPEC WOO-2023 |
OPEC YoY Change |
IEA WEO-2022 (STEPS) |
IEA WEO-2023 (STEPS) |
IEA YoY Change |
| Base year |
96.9 (2021) |
99.6 (2022) |
-- |
~99 (2021) |
~100 (2022) |
-- |
| 2025 |
105.5 |
106.1 |
+0.6 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| 2027/2028 |
107.0 (2027) |
110.2 (2028) |
+3.2 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| 2030 |
108.3 |
112.0 |
+3.7 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| 2035 |
109.5 |
114.4 |
+4.9 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| 2040 |
109.8 |
115.4 |
+5.6 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| 2045 |
109.8 |
116.0 |
+6.2 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
Note: IEA WEO does not publish explicit mb/d demand tables in its executive summary. Key qualitative markers are provided below.
Oil Demand Peak Timing
| Organization |
Edition |
Peak Year (Central Scenario) |
Peak Description |
| IEA |
WEO-2022 (STEPS) |
Mid-2030s |
Levels off, then ebbs slightly to mid-century |
| IEA |
WEO-2023 (STEPS) |
Before 2030 |
Slow decline through 2050 |
| OPEC |
WOO-2022 (Ref Case) |
No peak by 2045 |
Plateaus after ~2035 at ~109.8 mb/d |
| OPEC |
WOO-2023 (Ref Case) |
No peak by 2045 |
Continued growth to 116 mb/d |
Oil Demand by OECD / Non-OECD (OPEC data, mb/d)
| Region |
OPEC 2022 (base/2045) |
OPEC 2023 (base/2045) |
Change in 2045 level |
| OECD |
44.8 / 34.1 |
45.9 / 36.7 |
+2.6 |
| Non-OECD |
52.2 / 75.7 |
53.6 / 79.4 |
+3.7 |
| World |
96.9 / 109.8 |
99.6 / 116.0 |
+6.2 |
Sectoral Oil Demand Growth (2045 vs base year, OPEC data, mb/d)
| Sector |
OPEC WOO-2022 |
OPEC WOO-2023 |
Change |
| Road transportation |
+3.8 |
+4.6 |
+0.8 |
| Aviation |
+4.1 |
+4.1 |
0.0 |
| Petrochemicals |
+3.7 |
+4.3 |
+0.6 |
| Residential/Commercial/Agr. |
+0.8 |
+1.6 |
+0.8 |
| Other industry |
+0.5 |
+1.5 |
+1.0 |
| Electricity generation |
-0.9 |
-0.8 |
+0.1 |
| Other |
+0.8 |
+1.1 |
+0.3 |
| Total |
+12.9 |
+16.4 |
+3.5 |
Oil Investment Requirements (OPEC data, cumulative to 2045)
| Category |
OPEC WOO-2022 |
OPEC WOO-2023 |
Change |
| Total oil sector |
$12.1 trillion |
$14.0 trillion |
+$1.9 trillion |
| Upstream |
~$9.5 trillion (est.) |
$11.1 trillion |
+~$1.6 trillion |
| Downstream |
-- |
$1.7 trillion |
-- |
| Midstream |
-- |
$1.2 trillion |
-- |
| Annual average |
~$500 bn |
~$610 bn |
+~$110 bn |
IEA Investment Indicators
| Metric |
WEO-2022 |
WEO-2023 |
| Clean energy investment by 2030 (STEPS) |
>USD 2 trillion |
Rising (40% up since 2020) |
| Clean energy investment by 2030 (NZE) |
>USD 4 trillion |
-- |
| Upstream O&G (STEPS) to 2030 |
~USD 650 bn/year avg |
No increase needed vs. today |
| Clean-to-fossil spending ratio |
1.5:1 |
Higher (implied) |
| EMDE transition investment gap (NZE) |
Large |
Must rise 5x by 2030 |
Fossil Fuel Share in Global Energy Mix
| Metric |
IEA WEO-2022 |
IEA WEO-2023 |
OPEC WOO-2022 |
OPEC WOO-2023 |
| Current |
~80% |
~80% |
~80% |
>80% |
| 2030 |
<75% |
73% |
-- |
-- |
| 2045 |
-- |
-- |
~70% |
~69% |
| 2050 |
Just above 60% |
-- |
-- |
-- |
CO2 Emissions / Temperature Outcomes (IEA STEPS)
| Metric |
WEO-2022 |
WEO-2023 |
| Emissions peak |
2025, ~37 Gt |
Mid-2020s |
| 2050 emissions |
32 Gt |
High (slow decline) |
| Implied warming (2100) |
~2.5 C |
~2.4 C |
| Improvement since Paris (2015) |
~1 C shaved off |
Further improved |
EV Penetration Assumptions
| Metric |
IEA WEO-2022 |
IEA WEO-2023 |
OPEC WOO-2022 |
OPEC WOO-2023 |
| EV share of car sales (2023 actual) |
~10% (implied) |
1 in 5 (20%) |
Not stated |
Not stated |
| US EV share 2030 (STEPS) |
Not explicit (IRA new) |
50% |
-- |
-- |
| EV fleet 2045 |
-- |
-- |
540 million (22% of fleet) |
Not restated |
| ICE dominance view |
Challenged |
Ended |
Maintained |
Maintained |
| ICE car sales peak |
Not explicit |
2017 |
Not stated |
Not stated |
Non-OPEC Supply Peak (OPEC data)
| Metric |
WOO-2022 |
WOO-2023 |
| US tight oil peak |
~16 mb/d, around 2030 |
Around end of current decade |
| Non-OPEC total peak |
Early 2030s |
Early 2030s |
| Non-OPEC 2045 |
67.5 mb/d |
69.9 mb/d |
| OPEC share 2045 |
~39% |
40% |
| OPEC liquids 2045 |
42.4 mb/d |
46.1 mb/d |
Key Takeaway for Investment Decision
The two most authoritative energy organizations are moving in opposite directions on oil demand:
- IEA revised the oil demand peak 5-8 years earlier (mid-2030s to before 2030) between WEO-2022 and WEO-2023.
- OPEC revised 2045 oil demand 6.2 mb/d higher (109.8 to 116.0 mb/d) between WOO-2022 and WOO-2023.
This widening divergence is the single most important structural uncertainty for any large-scale crude oil industry chain investment with a 10-20+ year horizon. The gap between the IEA and OPEC views on long-term oil demand now spans roughly 15-20 mb/d, equivalent to the entire output of Saudi Arabia plus Russia. Any investment thesis must explicitly stress-test against both scenarios and identify which segments of the value chain (upstream, midstream, downstream, petrochemicals) are most robust across this range of outcomes.