Strait of Hormuz (霍尔木兹海峡)¶
The world's most critical oil transit chokepoint. Effectively closed since late February 2026 following US-Israel air strikes on Iran.
Pre-Crisis Flow (2025)¶
- ~20 mb/d of crude and product exports transited the Strait
- Represented ~20% of world oil consumption
- ~35% of global seaborne crude trade
- 15 mb/d crude/condensate exports + 3.3 mb/d refined products + 1.5 mb/d LPG
Crisis Impact (March 2026)¶
- Near-complete cessation of tanker traffic
- Production curtailed by at least 10 mb/d (8 mb/d crude + 2 mb/d condensates/NGLs)
- VLCC rates >6x five-year average
- US proposed naval escort fleet for convoy passage
- Iraq in contact with Iran for partial tanker passage
Crisis Evolution (March–May 2026)¶
4月18日: 特朗普宣布霍尔木兹协议¶
- 三阶段重开计划（30天/60天/90天）
- 油价单日暴跌11-18%（Brent $138.60→$113.50）
- 但协议执行存在重大不确定性（阶段1:70%, 阶段2:50%, 阶段3:30%）
5月: 华尔街共识根本性转向 — Taco→Natural¶
- Taco共识（失效）: 市场原以为特朗普会因选情压力妥协重开海峡，但十周谈判无果
- Natural共识（确立）: 市场接受海峡短期内不可能重开，僵局是长期结构性特征
- 跨市场验证: 利率市场（30Y>5%）、保险市场（战争险战前8倍）、石油市场（Brent固守$100+）已三重确认
- 核心驱动: 特朗普面临"双输困境"——妥协摧毁政治品牌vs僵持持续经济放血，最可能选择"不上不下不开"
- 详见: taco-natural-consensus-framework | 2026-05-15-wall-street-consensus-shift
Bypass Options¶
- Saudi East-West Pipeline to Yanbu (Red Sea): up to 5 mb/d capacity
- UAE ADCOP Pipeline to Fujairah: 0.5-0.7 mb/d (but Fujairah port also under attack)
- Combined bypass capacity far below disrupted volume
Key Dependent Importers¶
- China: 37% of total Hormuz exports (5.2 mb/d), holds 120 days strategic stocks
- India: 14% (2.1 mb/d), 40% of India's total crude imports, most vulnerable near-term
- Japan: 12% (1.7 mb/d), 77% of Japan's total crude supply
- Korea: 12% (1.7 mb/d), 62% of total crude imports